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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
CLYDE L. BALL*
MUcNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Police Power: Conformity of Ordinance to State Statute: The town
of Fayetteville enacted an ordinance imposing higher standards than
those established by state and federal laws upon producers, of milk
to be sold within the city. In State ex rel. Beasley v. Mayor and
Aldermen of Fayetteville' plaintiff milk producer, having complied
with state and federal requirements, was denied a permit to sell in-
side the city and sought a writ of mandamus to require the city
authorities to issue the permit. Under the holding in State ex rel.
Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Shelbyville,2 a municipality could not
refuse to issue a permit to sell milk therein when the foreign milk
producer had, according to state and local inspections at producer's
home county, met the requirements of federal, state and county rules.
Apparently in the Shelbyville case the standard in the city was no
higher than that set by the federal and state authorities; the real
question was whether the city had the right to rely on its own in-
spection facilities and to limit permits to those whom it could and
did inspect and approve. The Fayetteville case presents a more
significant issue: may a municipality, in the exercise of its delegated
police power, adopt a more stringent rule than that of the delegating
state? The general rule is that state regulation of milk standards does
not preclude the municipality from acting in the same field, but that
the city ordinance must be in conformity with the state statute.3
It would seem that conformity does not require identity, but rather
the absence of conflict. The question was not answered finally in the
Fayetteville case, because a state statute was enacted during the
progress of the suit expressly authorizing municipalities to adopt
more stringent regulations.4 Therefore, the only question finally
answered is that, with state permission, a municipality may adopt
more stringent regulations and higher standards than those established
by state law governing the same subject.
Ordinances: Proof of Irregularity in Enactment: In Brumley v.
Town of Greeneville5 the minutes of the town board recited that an
ordinance authorizing a condemnation proceeding by the town was
"passed on first" and subsequent readings, as required by the town
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Editor, Vander-
bilt Law Review.
1. 268 S.W.2d 330 (Tenn. 1954).
2. 192 Tenn. 194, 203, 240 S.W.2d 239, 243 (1951).
3. 7 McQUMIn, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.415 (3d ed., Smith 1949).
4. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 114, §11.
5. 274 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
1061
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
charter.6 The defendant in the condemnation proceeding attacked the
ordinance as invalid because it had not actually been presented and
read three times, and defendant offered the testimony of the person
who prepared the minutes to prove his contention. The court admitted
the testimony on the ground that the recitation in the minutes was
ambiguous in that although it stated that the ordinance passed three
readings it did not show that the ordinance was read three times;
hence extrinsic evidence was admissible to clarify the ambiguity.
Furthermore, the court commented that minutes reciting action
which would clothe the town with rights which it was seeking to as-
sert as a litigant against a private individual were in the nature of
self-serving declarations, and thus by inference open to question. The
language of the court indicates that it is not suggesting that in every
instance the minutes of the municipal legislative body are open to
question, but only where there is ambiguity, bad faith, or special
interest. Just how important each of these factors may be is not
entirely clear.
Generally, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict municipal
records, and the rule applies to enactment of ordinances. 7 According to
a leading authority, this rule as it applies to legislative action on a bill
is giving way to the "extrinsic evidence rule" which holds that the
validity of an enrolled bill may be attacked by any "clear, satisfactory
and convincing" evidence.8 The somewhat strained finding of am-
biguity in the minutes in the Greeneville case permitted the court to
consider extrinsic evidence without altering the basic rule.
Special Legislation: By private act 9 the legislature provided a new
charter for the Town of Dayton, and expressly provided that the
"... Charter of the City of Dayton shall not be subject to the pro-
visions of the Public Acts of 1921, Chapter 173 . . . [which gives to
every municipality the right to adopt a city manager form of govern-
ment]." In Furnace v. City of Dayton10 the Supreme Court struck
down the provision as violating both Article I, Section 8, and Article
XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. That such provisions are
patently unconstitutional does not serve to prevent their appearance
periodically. Legislative manipulation of the government of individual
cities dies hard.
Zoning: Political pressure and hard "sympathy" cases are twin
enemies of the impartial and effective administration of zoning laws.
In Grant v. McCullough" sympathy for a property owner who was
6. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1903, c. 563, § 12, requires all ordinances involving the
appropriation of money to be "read once on three separate days and passed on
its third reading by a majority of the entire board."
7. 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 14.07 (3d ed., Smith 1949).
8. 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1405 (3d ed., Horack 1943).
9. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1953, c. 267.
10. 274 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1954).
11. 270 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1954).
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in an unfortunate personal economic position led to a zoning amend-
ment which rezoned one lot in the middle of a block from Residential
C to Commercial A. No other lots in the block were affected. The
Supreme Court, being better insulated from the immediate pressures,




Zoning: Chapter 33 of the Public Acts of 193513 empowers county
courts to zone county areas outside the corporate limits of municipali-
ties and provides that a county court may amend its zoning plan by
ordinance. A hearing must be held on proposed amendments; notice
thereof must be given at least thirty days before the hearing; and the
proposed amendment must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county.14 Clapp v. Knox County5 posed three ques-
tions under the amendment provisions of the statute: (1) Must the
required notice be given by a county official? The court ruled that
it need not be so given; if the notice sufficiently informs interested
persons of the time, place and subject matter of the hearing, it is
good. (2) Must the specific amendment be set out verbatim in the
notice? The court held that substantial compliance was sufficient;
that is, that the notice give sufficient information from which in-
terested parties may determine the precise effect of the amendment.
(3) Will a resolution satisfy the statutory requirement of amendment
by ordinance? The court ruled that it would, reasoning that it was
not the intention of the legislature to spell out exact procedures and




Nature of School District: An incorporated school district is not a
municipal corporation, but is a public corporation in the same class
with counties, and occupying the same legal status, said the Supreme
Court in Barnett v. Memphis.7 A municipal corporation, though
created by the state, may engage in proprietary activities which are
not undertaken in pursuance of governmental duties. A school district,
on the other hand, is created to perform one of the functions of govern-
ment, and is an arm of the state for such purpose.18 The case involved
a tort action and evoked a statement that schools are a governmental
12. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 8.
13. TENN. CODE §§ 10268.1-10268.14 (Official Supp. 1950).
14. Id. § 10268.5.
15. 273 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1954).
16. See 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 411, p. 787 (1949).
17. 269 S.W.2d 906 (Tenn. 1954).
18. This distinction is ably discussed in Note, 160 A.L.R. 7, 58-62 (1946).
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function. That this is so is well settled.19 The result in the case is
consistent with the generally stated rule.20
HousING AUTHORITIES
Power: In Harper v. Trenton Housing Authority2' a landowner
sought to defeat the right of the Authority to take his unimproved
land for purposes of a Negro housing project on the ground that the
Authority had abused its discretion in selecting the particular land
for a Negro project. The court ruled against this contention by
restating the rule that "in the absence of a clear and palpable abuse
of power, the determination of the necessity for the taking and what
property shall be taken is not a question for the judiciary, but for
the Legislature or the body to whom the right of eminent domain is
delegated by it." ' To this rule the instant case adds that "palpable"
does not require a finding of fraud, bad faith or sinister motive.
23
A second contention of the landowner was that the purpose of the
housing authority is to clear slums, and that this purpose is not
-effectuated by condemning vacant lots. This contention was rejected
also; the purposes of housing authorities extends beyond slum clear-
ance to include the provision of adequate housing for low income
groups.2 4
Declaration of Taking-Interest on Money Deposited in Court: The
Tennessee Housing Authority Statute2 provides that an authority may
file a declaration of taking and deposit in court the estimated value of
the land involved, and title to the land will vest immediately in the
authority. The actual compensation to be paid to the owners is then
arrived at in the usual manner. When the estimated sum is smaller
than the compensation ultimately set, the authority must pay the
difference with interest from the filing of the declaration of taking.
Nashville Housing Authority v. Doyle2 6 posed the question as to
whether the authority must also pay interest on the amount deposited
in court. The Tennessee Supreme Court holds that it must. This is in
interesting contrast to the rule under the Federal Housing Act
2 7 to
19. Hamiltori County v. Bryant, 175 Tenn. 123, 132 S.W.2d 639 (1939);
Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1936); Kee v. Parks, 153 Tenn.
306, 283 S.W. 751 (1926).
20. "[T]here is a distinction between municipal corporations proper and
quasi-municipal corporations [counties, towns, school districts and the like]
concerning liability for torts .... [T]he general rule is that the latter are
not liable for torts unless so provided by statute." 18 McQuILLW, MUNIcIPAL
CoRPoRATIoNs § 53.05, p. 142 (3d ed., Smith 1950).
21. 274 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
22. Williamson County v. Franklin & Spring Hill Turnpike Co., 143 Tenn.
628, 647, 228 S.W. 714, 719 (1921).
23. 274 S.W.2d at 642.
24. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3647.1-3647.29y (Williams Supp. 1952).
25. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1937, c. 183.
26. 276 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1955).
27. 46 STAT. 1421, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 258a et seq. (1952).
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the effect that such interest is not payable.28 As the Tennessee court
pointed out, the provisions of the two statutes differ, so that the
differing results are not necessarily the product of conflicting ra-
tionales.
OFFICERS
Justices of the Peace: State ex rel. v. Brown29 was a suit to establish
the proposition that a justice of the peace who accepted appointment
as a county road commissioner thereby automatically vacated his
office as a justice. The Supreme Court, in ruling to the contrary, was
confronted by three questions: (1) Is a justice of the peace within the
purview of Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution which
provides that an inferior judge "shall not... hold any office of trust
or profit under this State. . . ." The court pointed out that the same
clause of the constitution prohibits an inferior judge from receiving
any fees or perquisites of office, and as justices of the peace had al-
ways been entitled to fees and perquisites of office, the clause patently
was not intended to apply to them. (2) Does Section 2986 of the Ten-
nessee Code30 which expressly states that no justice of the peace shall
be a member of a road commission apply in this case? The words of
the statutory provision certainly include all justices of the peace and
all road commissions. As the court pointed out, however, a reading of
the entire act from which the particular section was drawn discloses
that the act was intended to apply only to road commissions which
were set up pursuant to the act for the purposes of supervising the
expenditure of funds raised through bond issues, and had no applica-
tion to road commissions generally. (3) Is membership on a road
commission which is charged with "supervision and control of the
construction, maintenance and repairs of all public roads . . . in the
County" occupying an office incompatible with that of a justice of
the peace so as to be subject to the common-law rule that one who
accepts a second office incompatible with one already held thereby
vacates the first office? Here, it is submitted, is the significant question
insofar as the law of officers is concerned. The first two questions
answered by the court were problems of statutory construction. The
solution to the third question turns upon the determination of in-
compatibility. The court had previously ruled that a position as
teacher in the county school system was not incompatible with the
office of justice of the peace because the only connection which a
justice had with the school system was to levy taxes for its support.31
Application of the same reasoning leads to the same result in the
instant case-the only connection which the justice has with the
28. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 381 (1943).
29. 270 S.W.2d 334 (Tenn. 1954).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2986 (Williams 1934).
31. State ex tel. Boles v. Groce, 152 Tenn. 566, 280 S.W. 27 (1926).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
road commission is to levy taxes to raise funds for the commission.
Service on the commission is then not incompatible with service as a
justice of the peace. Out of the two cases a general rule is beginning
to emerge: a justice of the peace may, without vacating his office,
become a public employee, if the county quarterly court of which
the justice is a member does no more than levy taxes for support of
the employing agency.
Officers De Facto: Where members of a county beer board have
been improperly appointed, what is the proper method of attacking
their authority to act? In Evers v. Hollman32 the county beer board
had been appointed by the county judge instead of by the county
court as required by statute.33 The board revoked plaintiff's license
to sell beer, and she sued out a common-law writ of certiorari and
took the case to the circuit court where she challenged the authority
of the beer board to act. The Supreme Court, reversing the circuit
court, held that the authority of the board could not be thus challenged
in a collateral proceeding.
The holding of the court seems clearly correct. A person is a
de facto officer where the duties of his office are exercised "under
color of a known... appointment, void because ... there was a want
of power in the . . .appointing body. '34 This definition would seem
to fit the beer board perfectly. The Tennessee Supreme Court has
previously ruled in an exhaustive opinion that the acts of de facto
officers with respect to third persons may not be collaterally attacked.
35
The proper proceeding to challenge the authority of the beer board
would seem to be a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto.36
The petitioner in Evers v. Hollman may well have been misled in
her procedure by the case of Crowe v. Carter County37 where the
petitioner sought to enjoin the action of a beer board on the ground
that the board had not been properly elected. The court properly
ruled that injunction was not the appropriate remedy, but appeared to
base its holding on the ground that the statute38 specifically provides
that certiorari shall be the sole method of review of the action of a
beer board. The proper basis for the holding is the same as that in
the Evers case-an attack upon the status of a board is not a proceed-
ing to review the action of the board. A review on the merits of
board action is obtained solely by certiorari; quo warranto is the
proper method of attacking the status of the members of the board.
32. 268 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. 1954).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1191.14 (Williams 1934).
34. 43 Am. JuR., Public Officers § 471 (1942).
35. Ridout v. State, 161 Tenn. 248, 30 S.W.2d 255 (1930).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9336 (Williams 1934); State ex rel. Pike v. Hammons,
163 Tenn. 290, 43 S.W.2d 395 (1931).
37. 195 Tenn. 659, 263 S.W.2d 509 (1953); Sanders, Administrative Law-
1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 733, 740 (1954).
38. TENN. CODE § 1191.14 (Official Supp. 1950).
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